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On April 15, Joe Biden became the second president to announce a timeline for military 
withdrawal from Afghanistan. He’s said we’ll be gone by September 11 this year. Donald 
Trump’s deadline had been May 1 of this year, as the Taliban have been enthusiastically 
reminding anyone who will listen. We are living in the twilight of “boots on the ground” in 
Afghanistan.  
If you’re one of the many extremely casual observers of the Afghan War, here’s an 
update: the Taliban remain strong and are making military gains against an impotent Afghan 
government. Allegedly tripartite negotiations between the US, the Taliban, and the Afghan 
government have not really included the latter since the Taliban, holders of all the leverage, all 
the time, and all the political will, usually only consent to engage directly with the US. One 
reason for this decision is the handy way it reinforces the Taliban narrative of a puppet 
government in Kabul. At the moment the Taliban are declining to attend further negotiations, 
citing the US’ violation of the Trump-negotiated May 1 deadline. Expert consensus is that the 
US withdrawal will leave the Taliban in fine position to destroy the Afghan military and either 
take control of the country or start a period of multiparty violence among Taliban factions and 
regional warlords. Now you’re up to speed. 
American chatter about Biden’s new timeline has rightly centered on the effect American 
withdrawal (and Taliban resurgence) will have the Afghan public. Every Afghan, but especially 
those who served in the security forces, worked with the US or NATO, or actively worked to 
rebuild society after 2002 could find themselves in danger as the Taliban raise their flags again. 
Much of the media oxygen on this topic has been taken up by concern for Afghan military 
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interpreters, many of whom now find themselves on the Department of State’s special 
immigration visa waitlist, which numbers some 18,000 applicants and moves glacially.  
Widespread interest in the fate of Afghans who stood alongside US forces, or the legions 
of Afghan civilians who find themselves refugees or asylum seekers, is overdue. Media churn 
prompted by the withdrawal announcement may energize the class of international affairs 
professionals and career humanitarians that have always kept the fallout of the Afghan War front 
of mind. But in strange coincidence, two weeks before Biden’s announcement, a different kind 
of media event attempted to engage not just the DC foreign policy clique but the American 
public in a conversation about our relationships, and particularly obligations, to Afghan people.  
This effort came, somehow, bizarrely, in the form of a multi-cam laugh-track network TV 
sitcom. Twenty years after American bombs started dropping near Kabul, two weeks before the 
President of the United States announced a plan of unconditional withdrawal, Hollywood began 
telling stories about the people whose country we’ve been fighting in for one fifth of a century. 
The charge was led by the guy who brought you Two and a Half Men. 
THE SHOW 
The United States of Al is a CBS product about Awalmir (“Al”), an Afghan who served 
as an interpreter for the US military, moving into the Ohio home of Riley, a former marine and 
Awalmir’s old partner from the war. It airs Thursdays at 8:30 EST. It is very much a sitcom. 
There are canned laughs. There are maybe like four or five sets. The show is photographed in 
warm browns evocative of a red-state Big Bang Theory. Speaking of which, US of Al is produced 
by Chuck Lorre, the TV demigod/producer behind Big Bang Theory and Roseanne. There are 
jokes about men cooking poorly. There is a blustery dad whose provincial ignorance belies a 
golden heart. The female lead is, of course, played by a supermodel. Do you get the vibe? 
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 Review: Not very funny, but interesting if your bag is theorizing about representations of 
Muslims, brown people, veterans, wounded masculinity, Trojan-horse schemes to bring Othered 
demographic slices into the mainstream, racial biases that undergird the whole idea of a 
mainstream, cross-cultural relationships of any kind, grief.  
US of Al’s origin story is more interesting than the show itself: the creators (David 
Goetsch and Maria Ferrari, probably familiar to fans of the Chuck Lorre cinematic universe) 
were inspired to create an Afghan-interpreter protagonist after learning about the aforementioned 
massive backlog in special immigration visa applications from interpreters who served in the 
9/11 wars. This dovetailed nicely with executive producer Reza Aslan’s desire to put a Muslim 
protagonist on a major network TV show.  
Also (unfortunately) more interesting than the show itself: the surrounding internet 
discourse. Long before the April 1 premiere, critics were throwing darts over the casting of 
Indian/South African Adhir Kalyan as the titular Afghan character while Kalyan was taking 
pains to assure everyone his casting was not a representational disaster. The show’s trailer and 
critic screenings brought allegations of orientalist minstrelsy, but these were complicated by the 
writer’s room including Afghan American talents Fahim Anwar and Ursula Taherian, plus 
renowned Afghan-born Canadian writer Habib Zahori, who served as a military interpreter. If 
Zahori writes a joke about a hapless Afghan overcome by the sight of an American waitress’s 
bare legs and says the idea for the joke came from his life, two things are occurring at the same 
time: 1) we are being fed the ancient trope of a man of color impotently lusting after a white 
woman and 2) we are watching Zahori, Fulbright scholar and war hero, try to use humor to 
unpack his lived experiences. This would all be much easier to wrestle with if the show was 
funny.  
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That US of Al leaves much to be desired in terms of humor is not a hot take. Reviews 
have run the narrow gamut from disappointed shrugs to the majestic hatchet-job run by Al 
Jazeera, which panned the show’s humor while raising worthy questions about the ethics of 
comedy that comes from an occupying power.  
 US of Al’s serious aspects are less cringeworthy, but not better. As you’d expect in a 
show that centers two alumni of the Afghan war, there are attempts to explore combat’s effects 
on families and lives. The casting of Dean Norris as the marine Riley’s father is fascinating in 
this regard. Norris is most famous for his turn as DEA agent Hank Schrader on AMC’s Breaking 
Bad. Schrader was the prestige-TV OG of swaggering white machismo running headfirst into 
crippling trauma. The Hank Schrader arc took a humane look at what happens when someone 
steeped in bourgeois-cowboy culture encounters pitiless institutions like Mexico’s cartels. The 
take resonated with at least some veterans circa 2013. US of Al is obviously not operating in a 
part of the media cosmos where unflinching looks at violence are appreciated. It’s hard to see 
how a twenty-five-minute sitcom that aspires to funniness (someday, maybe) would handle the 
kinds of psychological evolution that made Hank’s Breaking Bad journey compelling.   
This is not to say that the sitcom form precludes making insightful statements about war. 
In fact, when I reflect on the Afghan war and Hollywood’s various attempts to say something 
about it, I think sitcoms might come the closest to evoking the war’s place in our culture and the 
experience of serving in it.  
For most Americans, sitcoms align more with historical eras than discrete moments (I’m 
getting sick of hearing people use Leave it to Beaver as shorthand for a giant set of 
political/cultural sensibilities). September 11, 2001, aside, the same is true of the Afghan War, 
which hummed along as a quiet part of the early aughts and teens zeitgeist of this century. 
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Sitcoms, as a rule, do not disrupt anyone’s life. Sitcoms are low-stakes, low-intensity, easy 
viewing. The start date of a sitcom is obvious, but the actual TV product is a self-perpetuating 
system that will continue as long as it is profitable enough and not overly offensive to anybody. 
If a sitcom must end, narrative closure is secondary to the simple cessation of the thing in order 
to make room for other programming. The endings, if they are written at all, have a track record 
of falling short (Scrubs, Gilmore Girls, to name a couple high-profile clunkers).  
The Afghan War hasn’t worn us down so much as integrated into the enduring reality of 
public life. For twenty years, Afghanistan has been the most reliable referent for any public 
tribute to “our men and women serving in harm’s way”; a constant “issue” compared to our in-
or-out misadventures in Iraq, Somalia, the Philippines, Yemen, etc. As we went from Bush to 
Obama to Trump to Biden, the routine of regular Afghan policy reviews and congressional 
testimony on “progress” became its own semi-scripted beltway ritual, like each new president’s 
outline of their North Korea policy.  
Hollywood products on the Afghan War, mostly movies, reflect this normalization: the 
stories are almost all about the stasis of the “normal” war being interrupted by some crisis before 
stasis is reasserted through heroic action. By the end the heroes have achieved a return to the 
normal war of potshots and improvised explosive devices.  
The heavyweight champion of the canon is Lone Survivor, the Mark Wahlberg-led 2013 
film adaptation of Marcus Luttrell’s eponymous memoir. The war is in full swing at the start of 
the movie, in which Navy SEALs attempt a routine surveillance mission, disaster occurs, and 
various acts of heroism return the surviving SEAL and the Afghans who helped him to the 
status-quo ante (ante the disaster that is, not the war itself). In 2020’s The Outpost, about the 
battle of Kamdesh, the routine of an American patrol base is disrupted by a massive Taliban 
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offensive, which rages until enough bombs have been dropped. The personal stakes for the film’s 
heroes are, of course, immense, but the film ends with just one more small valley changing 
hands.  
It’s natural that filmmakers angling to highlight the greatest tales of heroism from 
Afghanistan will zero in on the rare (if spectacularly violent) disruptions to what has otherwise 
been, for the American public, a boring slog full of confusing names. Even films posturing 
themselves as critical of the war or military adventure find their possibilities so circumscribed by 
the War’s long-haul reality that they inevitably partake of the there-and-back-again-ism that 
describes the arc of films like Survivor. The Tina Fey-led Whiskey Tango Foxtrot leaned all the 
way into the trope of the Afghan War as an enduring field upon which Westerners can adventure 
and prove themselves by adapting Kim Barker’s correspondent memoir into a bizarro-Orientalist 
Eat Pray Love in which, let us never forget, Alfred Molina plays the attorney general of 
Afghanistan.  
The semi-exception to the canon’s there-and-back-again-ism is 2018’s 12 Strong, about 
the US Special Forces working alongside the Afghan Northern Alliance to topple the Taliban 
regime after 9/11. This is weird to say about a movie in which Thor leads his bro-squad on 
horseback against a terrorist army, but 12 Strong’s placement of 9/11 as the prime-mover of the 
American intervention, plus the way it (gently) hints at the difficulties of building and 
maintaining alliances through its subplot with American ally and bloodthirsty warlord Abdul 
Rashid Dostum, makes it one of the only films that addresses the big why behind the Afghan 
war; treating it as a choice as opposed to mere setting. In chronological terms, 12 Strong starts 
the decades-long arc inhabited by films like The Outpost and concluded in the suburban tedium 
of The United States of Al. It’s weird to imagine that they are in fact the same story: the 
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swashbuckling tale of black-ops horsemen trading quips with warlords as they gallop across the 
steppes morphs into paranoid infantrymen squatting in a dilapidated camp for yet another 
rotation, and finally ends in Ohio with a Pashto man excited to finally visit a COSCTO.  
THE WAR SHOW 
The cycles of stasis-crisis-stasis seen in films like Lone Survivor were built on larger, 
older cultural cycles that determined the experience of war in Afghanistan. Most prominent in 
the region where I served was the agricultural cycle of cash crops, and particularly the poppies 
who’s processing fueled much of the global trade in heroin. The two annual poppy harvests (the 
nesh) prompted massive movements of itinerant labor throughout the Taliban’s heartland in 
Kandahar and Helmand Provinces; poor men who would fight against the Afghan government if 
fighting paid better than picking and processing. Fighting, like rain or Malcolm in the Middle, 
had a season. The emergence of this regional institution prompted a perverse show-business 
analogue: Taliban commanders, eager to impress sponsors in the Gulf and Pakistan, actually got 
in the habit of planning fighting season-premiere offensives that were designed for spectacle as 
much as anything else; the important thing being to remind the world that the war was still worth 
watching and funding. If you could synch your season opener with a bulge in available itinerant 
labor, you could guarantee a big, sexy fight with plenty of media coverage.  
The US brought its own cycles to the war. It is by now a cliché that due to regular 
American troop rotations we repeated the first year of the war twenty times. This cliché only 
became truer as the war went on: a new US commander going to Afghanistan in 2017 had 
sixteen years of precedent in which commanders basically maintained stasis and their careers did 
not suffer for it. Such a commander had a script. His superiors had a picture of what a successful 
rotation looked like based on the prior decade. There were roles to play, and failure to play them 
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became more unthinkable as the war went on and the conflict developed into a system that 
yielded career-enhancing combat tours for military personnel, fat profits for Afghan contractors, 
status and wealth for government-aligned local notables, drug money for many.   
The calcifying of roles in the Afghan War affected all players, and particularly those at 
the edge of the effort to advise a Western-modeled Afghan military into existence: US and 
NATO advisors, their Afghan partners, and interpreters like Awalmir from US of Al. The 
uncertainly of cross-cultural interaction was compounded by the stressors of combat, and all 
involved grasped at cultural touchstones they thought could assure their partners that we all knew 
who we were dealing with and what was going on. New American officers, seeking credibility, 
mimicked the affectation of a patrician Afghan reesh safeed. New interpreters, subject to 
scrutiny and suspicion, strenuously performed harmlessness and flattered their American 
principals in the interest of survival and continued employment. 
This is one way in which US of Al scores a direct hit, though perhaps not intentionally. 
The character Awalmir has been criticized as a neutered, weirdly flimsy person. He sometimes 
seems to chirp more than speak. It seems not to register as condescending when Dean Norris’ 
character wryly asks, “You’re an optimistic little guy, aren’t ya?” Yet Awalmir’s backstory 
would not be out of place in the Rambo series: Afghan born and raised, working with the marines 
for six years, he casually explains his frequent relocations with, “The Taliban were hunting me.” 
He is, objectively, a badass.  
My first time in Afghanistan I found myself talking through a bull-necked interpreter 
who had been helping people understand each other for many years, while getting shot at. His 
family, proud citizens of a country that has been in some kind of conflict for around forty years, 
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lived in semi-secrecy due to his affiliation with Americans. He had patrolled, dozens of times, 
with US Special Forces. He was, objectively, a badass.  
He was also a perceptive man who understood that Americans like to feel at the center of 
things, in control, and a little bit bad-boy dangerous. He understood that though he had seen 
more action in his life than I ever will, the role of “sidekick,” a set of expectations and norms 
forged mostly through Hollywood products, would be risky to abandon. He adjusted his self-
presentation accordingly, speaking loudly and often about how lucky Afghanistan was to have 
tough guys like the US Marines as friends1. Not wanting to disappoint, I did the converse: a little 
more macho, a little more swagger. I was part of a generation of marines who got our goalposts 
for acceptable marine-ness through pop culture before we ever spoke with a recruiter. I have met 
more than one person who can recite the good parts of Full Metal Jacket from memory. It 
appears Awalmir’s friend Riley, who slides into the role of brooding and chiseled Serious 
Veteran on US of Al, got all the right memos. 
When the writers’ room for US of Al concocts the cuddliest possible version of a Pashto 
war veteran, is some version of the above code-switch taking place? Awalmir may sincerely be 
written as an impossibly buoyant person. Is he actually carrying the pain of six years of fighting 
and a childhood under the Taliban? Are the Afghan writers on US of Al concerned about scaring 
away audiences the way my interpreters were wary of letting the full gravitas of their 
experiences fall on me? 
The family sitcom, in which audience expectations are shaped by the crushing 
normativity of the form, is an ingenious way to explore these questions in a way that is just as 
cyclical and directionless as the Afghan War was in its twenty-year run time. US of Al has 
 
1 I am not a political expert, but I know with 100% certainty that the problem with Afghanistan is not a lack of tough 
guys.  
In Which an Afghan War Veteran Contemplates The United States of Al  
Jon Pucci 
 10 
already showed that it deserves low expectations, but if enough people watch to keep it on the 
air, we may simply be forced to sit with it, year after year, watching ads for Awalmir’s show 
interrupt NFL games just like the Afghan War used to.  
The duration of a sitcom is the form’s superpower. Time is the one thing sitcoms have, at 
least in theory, that other forms do not. What will a writers’ room of Afghans want to say in 
season three, when in the real world the US will have been out of Afghanistan for two years and 
we will have a very good idea of whether or not Awalmir’s family, left behind in Kabul, would 
have been likely to survive whatever follows the US withdrawal? This is the worthiest thing 
about United States of Al: it invites us to imagine a future where Afghan storytellers, having 
adequately hit the cycles and roles of the sitcom form, have the social license, the resources, and 
the time to work through the relationships we built with the Afghans, and what those 
relationships might mean after the war. I hope that work can become programming as routine as 
the war used to be.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
